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INTRODUCTION

In the year 2000, a new patent aggregation business emerged under
the name Intellectual Ventures ("IV"). Armed with more than five
billion dollars from global companies such as Microsoft, Intel, Sony,
Nokia, Apple, Google, Yahoo, American Express, Adobe, SAP, Nvidia,
and eBay, IV aggressively acquired patents.' Within its first ten years
of existence, the privately-held company occupied the enviable spot of
being one of the top five U.S. patent owners.2 In March 2009, IV
expanded its reach globally to Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China,
India, and other countries, hoarding patents in important industries as
it opened new offices on foreign soil. 3 IV operated with a core belief
that "ideas are valuable" which led it to build "the invention capital
market."4 As of today, IV owns a portfolio of 70,000 patents and
collects more than three billion dollars in licensing fees.5 IV, however,
is the leader in the category of "a special brand of hatred in the
business world as the ultimate patent troll." 6
There are other patent aggregators with different business models in
the patent market. For example, Acacia Research Corporation is the
largest publicly traded patent-licensing company. The corporation is
also known as "the mother of all patent trolls."7 It touts that its
business model as an intermediary between patent owners and
licensees has brought three-quarters of a billion dollars to patent

1 See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Tom Ewing, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH.

L. REV. 1, 44-45 (providing an in-depth study of Intellectual Ventures).
2 Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Ventures: Revealing Investors, PATENTLY-O (May 18,

2011), https//patentlyo.com/patent/2011/05/intellectual-ventures-revealing-investors.html
(observing Intellectual Ventures had become one of the top five patent owners with a
portfolio of 30,000 patents).
3 Gregory T. Huang, Nathan Myhrvold & Co. on Tour as Intellectual Ventures Opens
Offices Across Asia, XCONOMY (Oct. 3, 2008), httpJ/www.xconomy.com/seattle/
2008/10/03/nathan-myhrvold-co-on-tour-as-intellectual-ventures-opens-offices-across-asia.
4 About Us, INTELLECTUAL VENTURES, http://www.intellectualventures.com/about
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
5 Jacob Demmitt, Intellectual Ventures: 70,000 Patents, $3 Billion in Licenses,
Dozens of Companies Sued, PUGET SOUND BUs. J. (Feb. 11, 2015, 2:05 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2015/02/intellectual-ventures-70000-patents-3-billion-in.html.
6 Ashlee Vance, Silicon Valley's Most Hated Patent Troll Stops Suing and Starts
Making,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
4, 2014,
6:23 AM), https//www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-09-04/intellectual-ventures-patent-troll-funds-startups-new-products.
7 Gene Quinn, Mother of All Patent Trolls, Acacia Research, Gets More Funding,
IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/08/10/patent-trollsacacia-research-funding/id= 12017/.
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owners.8 Allied Security Trust ("AST"), a Delaware Trust, was founded
in 2001 to identify, purchase, license, and divest high technology
patents. 9 AST aggregates patents from individual inventors, brokers,
firms, and academic institutions. 10 As a member-based cooperative,
AST assists its members by helping to purchase patents as part of
AST's divesting solution and by licensing strategic patents to its
members." Likewise, Google initiated its own patent acquisition,
calling on the public to offer up their patents for purchase and then
buying up twenty-eight percent of the patents submitted. 12 In May
2016, AST announced the first Industry Patent Purchase Program
("IP3"), an industry-wide, massive patent aggregation backed by
Google, Facebook, IBM, Microsoft, Adobe, SAP, Ford, Honda,
Hyundai, Kia Motors, Verizon, Cisco, Arris, and many other
multinational companies. 13 IP3 has targeted enterprise software,
communications, networking, semiconductors, automotive, content
delivery, and cloud computing.14
Alarmed by the rise of powerful patent aggregators in the United
States, governments from other countries have decided to counter
with their own initiatives of aggregating patents through the
establishment of Sovereign Patent Funds ("SPFs"). 15 In the last few
8 Overview, ACACIA REs. CTR., http://acaciaresearch.com/overview (last visited
Feb. 25, 2017).
9 Company Overview of Allied Security Trust, BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=2 14983336 (last visited Feb. 25,
2017, 9:00 AM).
10

Id.

11 About Us, ALLIED SEC. TR., http://www.ast.com/about-us/asts-mission (last
visited Feb. 25, 2017).
12 Tam Harbert, Google Tries to Keep Patents out of the Hands of Trolls, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Oct. 28, 2015, 3:00 PM), http//spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/google-tries-tokeep-patents-out-of-the-hands-of-trolls (reporting that Google paid prices ranging from
$3,000 to $250,000 per patent).
13 Calling All Patent Owners - Google, IBM, Ford, Cisco and Other Leading Global
Companies Want to Buy Your Patents - Through the New IP3 PurchaseProgramby AST,
9:15),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news(May
18,
2016,
PR NEWSWIRE
releases/calling-all-patent-owners--google-ibm-ford-cisco-and-other-leading-globalcompanies-want-to-buy-your-patents--through-the-new-ip3-purchase-program-by-ast300270804.html.
14 Id.
15 For example, the director of the Korean Intellectual Property Office informed
the media that Korea's sovereign patent funds were created to help Korean companies
protect themselves from "the threats of NPEs that buy patents only to claim royalties."
Miyuki Monroig & Patrick Terroir, Inside Asia's Patent Funds, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.,
July-Aug. 2012, at 85, 88. The Korean government admitted that it is acquiring
patents as part of waging "a patent war." Id.
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years, Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and France have each
launched SPFs. Other countries, including Canada, ponder whether
they should join the trend to create their own SPFs and participate in
the patent market.16
What are SPFs? How are they created and structured? What
purposes do SPFs serve? Are SPFs effective initiatives for foreign
governments to encourage innovation and foster competition or are
they merely state-sponsored patent trolls? Are they violating
international trade law, specifically the World Trade Organization
("WTO") Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures?
This Article is the first to address the above questions. The Article
proceeds as follows. Part I traces the creation of SPFs in Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, China, and France. Part I also explains when, why, and
how each country provides public funding to SPFs. There are many
different types of SPFs in different technology and life sciences areas,
and with specific goals and mandates, although several share the same
goal of aggregating patents. Open innovation and patent licensing are
two common themes among the different goals and approaches
employed by SPFs.
Part 11 investigates whether SPFs have engaged in patent assertions
- attempts to use acquired patents "to generate revenue by asserting
them against alleged infringers."17 Part II focuses on the simultaneous
litigations filed by the French SPF against LG Electronics Corporation
and HTC Germany GmbH in Germany and the United States.
Likewise, the Asian SPFs have filed lawsuits against multinational
companies. The investigation reveals surprises, including that
litigation is typically an SPF's last resort. SPFs are reluctant to embrace
litigation. Part II also examines SPFs' licensing strategies. French and
Korean SPFs seem to have success in licensing out. They direct more
efforts to selecting quality patents for licensing. In addition, Korean
and Japanese SPFs are engaging in licensing for open innovation.
SPFs have been condemned as global patent trolls and statesponsored patent trolls. Part III addresses whether the pejorative label
is warranted. Exploring the popular narrative of patent trolls and the
evolving landscape of the patent market where former manufacturing
companies and research institutions, along with other non-practicing

16 Jim Balsillie, Time to Invest in Better Protectionsfor Canada's Intellectual Property,
GLOBE & MAIL (July 18, 2014), http//www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/
time-to-invest-in-better-protections-for-canadas-intellectual-property/articlel9680612.
17 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PATENT AsSERTION ENTITY ACTIvIrY: AN FTC STUDY 1 (2016)

(releasing a comprehensive study of patent assertion entities in October 2016).
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enterprises ("NPEs"), 18 are participants, Part III reveals that the SPF
label does not fit SPFs' characteristics. SPFs are both diverse and
complex. Some have collaborated with universities to engage in
specific research and development projects. Some share their profits
with original inventors. Some facilitate open innovation. Some are
doing all of the above. Condemning SPFs as patent trolls amounts to
dismissing the true innovations, research, and development that have
been the hallmarks of many industries and sectors in Japan, South
Korea, China, and France.
SPFs have also been condemned as a trade protectionist measure in
violation of international trade law. Part IV examines the heavy
charges that SPFs discourage international technology transfers,
depress innovation, force foreign companies to accept unfavorable
license terms akin to discriminatory tax, support domestic industries
at the expense of foreign firms, resurrect ailing national companies,
and cause a race to the bottom. Part IV found no evidence to support
these condemnations. On the contrary, what SPFs have done since
their existence refutes these charges.
If SPFs are illegal subsidies in violation of international trade law,
there is an appropriate mechanism to remedy the harm. Part V turns
to the WTO solution, analyzing relevant provisions of the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Part V
discusses WTO Tribunal decisions, as they illuminate and interpret
legal requirements in subsidy cases. Part V further suggests that the
international framework is suited to eliminate SPFs if evidence exists
that a particular subsidy is causing injury to a domestic industry.
Certainly, using the appropriate channel to address SPFs is preferable
to dismissive and pejorative labeling.
Part VI, however, posits that an international trade solution might
be unnecessary because SPFs may soon be relics of the past. SPFs can
easily alter their structure to remove the government-sponsored
characteristic to quiet critics and restless nation litigants in the WTO
Tribunal. Moreover, the global innovation and patent market is
dynamic and complex; SPFs will not be able to survive and flourish if
they are under governmental control. Part VI observes that, in fact,
some prominent SPFs are planning to privatize in order to compete
and adapt.
18 Non-practicing enterprises are patent owners "who do not manufacture
products themselves, including universities, individual inventors, failed businesses,
and speculators who purchase patents from others." David L. Schwartz & Jay P.
Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-PracticingEntities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L.
REv. 425, 426 (2014).
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Overall, by creating and infusing SPFs with public funding to
aggregate patents, a government can seem to have ownership and
control of the patents while simultaneously wielding authority in
dispute proceedings relating to those very same patents. The
government can block or rule against others from challenging the
validity of patents. The same government may coerce others into
accepting unfavorable patent license terms. The same government also
may protect domestic firms at the expense of foreign firms. Such an
arrangement seems to create many conflicts. Additionally, SPFs may
be illegal subsidies under international trade law. Also, the creation of
SPFs suggests a new global chaos in patents. The new chaos raises fear
that SPFs would cause a race to the bottom. SPFs become sovereign
patent trolls with levers more potent than private patent trolls,
depressing innovation for short-term gains. The fear about SPFs,
however, is exaggerated. These concerns perhaps emanate from the
tendency to group all SPFs from different countries into one and
characterize them within the convenient patent troll narrative. Fear
not, the present and future development of different SPFs should
instead prompt us to rethink patents and the very laws creating them.
1.

FROM ASIA TO EUROPE: SOVEREIGN PATENT FUNDS

Asian countries with strong tech industry presence, from Japan and
South Korea to Taiwan and China, have followed one another in
creating sovereign patent funds. These funds are government-owned
patent aggregators. Across the globe, France takes the leading role
among European countries in creating SPFs. As carefully examined
below, each country creates and operates SPFs with different
objectives.
A.

Japan's INCJ, IP Bridge, and Other SPFs

The Japanese government, through the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry, established its sovereign patent fund, the Innovation
Network Corporation of Japan ("INCJ"), in July 2009.19 INCJ has a
specific purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing the value of
businesses in Japan. 20 With the explicit policy of protecting domestic
19 Overview, INNOVATION NETWORK CORP. JAPAN, httpsJ/www.incj.co.jp/english/
about/overview (last visited Jan. 4, 2018); 2 WORLD EcON. FORUM, Innovation Network
CorporationofJapan, in MANUFACTURING FOR GROWTH: PARTNERING FOR COMPETIVENESS 19,
19 (2013), httpi/www3.weforum.org/docs/VEFManufacturingForGrowth-ReportVol2
2013.pdf.
20 See WORLD. EcoN. FORUM, supra note 19.
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industries in key innovations, the Japanese government has already
injected 286 billion yen, or $2.5 billion, into INCJ and plans to
provide guarantees up to 1,800 billion yen, or $15.8 billion, for INCJ
investments. 21 Though INCJ has claimed that it is a public-private
initiative, private companies provide only five percent of the seed
capital.2 2 According to a recent press release, INCJ has invested 800
billion yen, or $7 billion, in seventy-nine projects on a broad range of
technology areas and has engaged in business development "through
intellectual property funds." 23 INCJ does not confine its activities to
Japan; it has "aggressive overseas development" to acquire "cuttingedge core technologies" from foreign companies.24
In September 2010, INCJ launched Japan's first intellectual property
fund, the Life-Science Intellectual Property Platform Fund ("LSIP"), to
acquire patents in four areas: biomarkers, stem cells, cancer, and
Alzheimer's disease. 25 The LSIP Fund's missions are to "increas[e] the
value of [intellectual property] in universities" and "rais[e] the
probability of success by universities .

.

. in commercializing their

advanced technology." 26 Leveraging INCJ's leading pharmaceutical
corporate partners, LSIP licenses the patents to the pharmaceutical
companies. 27 The LSIP Fund's activities are wholly managed by the
Intellectual Property Strategy Network, Inc. 28 INCJ has also been

acquiring patents through its "Rising Sun Fund" from universities and
public research institutions. 29
21 Overview, supra note 19.
22 See id.; WORLD EcoN. FORUM, supra note 19.
23 Press Release, Innovation Network Corp. of Japan, INCJ to Invest in NextGeneration DNA Sequencer Development Company, Quantum Biosystems Inc. (Feb.
9, 2015), http://www.incj.co.jp/PDF/1423210688.en.pdf.
24

fd

Press Release, Innovation Network Corp. of Japan, Establishment of Japan's
First Intellectual Prop. Fund: New Business Will Bundle and License Life-Science
Intellectual Property 1 (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.incj.co.jp/PDF/1281073862.01.pdf
[hereinafter Establishment ofJapan's IP Fund].
26 OECD, COMMERCIALISING PUBLIC RESEARCH: NEW TRENDS AND STRATEGIES 75
(2013) (explaining the Life Science IP Platform created by INCJ to purchase patents
from universities and public research institutions, and bundle the IP for licensing
arrangements with others).
25

27 IP

Bundling

Service,

INTELL.

PROP.

STRATEGY

NETWORK,

INC.,

http://www.ipsn.co.jp/e/index-e.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
28 Id.
29 Richard R. Bergovoy, IP & Licensing Trends in Japan, UCENSING L. BLOG (Aug. 9,
2010, 7:02 PM), http://thelicensinglawblog.com/2010/08/ip-licensing-trends-in-japan
lhttps//web.archive.org/web/20101029222326/http//thelicensinglawblog.conV2010/08/iplicensing-trends-in-japan].

2018]

Sovereign Patent Funds

1265

In addition to life sciences patents, INCJ focuses on other areas. For
example, in 2013 INCJ teamed up with two private companies to
establish another fund to purchase "idle intellectual property" in
technologies relating to mobile phones, LCD panels, and optical disks.
With the patent purchases, INCJ then monetizes them through
licensing to both domestic and foreign companies. 30 Strategically,
INCJ wants to turn profits on the investment by creating "attractive
bundles of intellectual property" for licensing to both domestic and
overseas companies. 31
Moreover, one of INCJ's most recent activities was the bidding war
between INCJ and a Taiwanese company to acquire Sharp
Corporation, a Japanese company once known as the global leader in
the display industry.32 From a patent perspective, Sharp's ownership of
a large patent portfolio of 53,670 was a reason INCJ did not want the
patents to fall in foreigners' control.33 Determined to keep Sharp's
technology in the Japanese economy, INCJ offered to acquire Sharp for
one trillion yen, or $8.8 billion.34
INCJ also created a subsidiary called IP Bridge to further procure
and license patents. 3 5 IP Bridge owns a sizable patent portfolio from

Panasonic and its affiliates, and by some estimates that acquisition
accounts for eighty-three percent of IP Bridge's patent holdings. 36
Also, IP Bridge received 500 patents from Fujitsu.3 7 IP Bridge takes an
30 Id.; see also OECD, supranote 26.
31 Establishment of Japan's IP Fund, supra note 25, at 2.
32 Takashi Amano & Pavel Alpeyev, INCJ Said to Argue Its Y1 Trillion Bid for Sharp
Tops Foxconn's, JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/
02/09/business/corporate-business/incj-said-argue-%C2%A51-trillion-bid-sharp-topsfoxconns/#.VsukpfkrJhE.
33 See Company Profile: Sharp, PATSNAP, http://www.patsnap.com/resources/
innovation/sharp-corporation (last updated July 4, 2017), reporting that as of July 4,
2017, Sharp Corporation "has a total of 53,670 granted patents and 171,567 patent
applications distributed into 129,849 patent families.... The main technology areas
are semiconductor devices; electric solid state devices, pictorial communication and
arrangements for the control of the intensity, colour, phase, polarisation or direction

of light."

34
35

See id.; Amano & Alpeyev, supra note 32.
See IP Bridge Promotes Open Innovation by Sharing a 3,500-Strong Portfolio of
Japanese Intellectual Property, JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORG., https://www.jetro.go.jp/
en/mjcompany/ip.bridge.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) [hereinafter JETRO].
36 Jack Ellis, As Korean, French and Japanese Sovereign Patent Funds Gain Traction,
Other Countries Warm Towards the Model, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (July 25, 2016),
http/www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=6a644cb6-2a44-446b-b520-114e55a9ef7f.
37 Jack Ellis, Fujitsu Revealed as Major Corporate that Assigned 500 Assets to Sovereign
Patent Fund IP Bridge, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (July 20, 2015), http//www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=75ba041f-410e-4d62-a27b-d5d95f6bcf4d.
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active role in enforcing the patents that it has aggregated. Its business
model is based on a firm stance against free-riders by forcing them to
pay a "license fee" of which IP Bridge would keep half of the amount
and return the remainder to the original patent owners. 38 Interestingly,
IP Bridge believes that Japan is not yet an open innovation society.39
To rectify the systemic problem, IP Bridge claims that its initial goals
and activities are also helping Japan in promoting an open innovation
society. 40
B.

South Korea's Intellectual Discovery, IP Cube Partners, and KDB
Infra IP Capital

The South Korean government is openly advancing its goal in patent
aggregation and market investments.4 1 In 2010, the South Korean
Ministry of Economics established a sovereign patent fund,
Intellectual Discovery ("ID"). 42 The government provided $140
million to ID, and private companies also invested, albeit modestly, in
the fund.43 Between 2011 and 2013, ID received an additional $250
million from both the government and private sectors.4 4 Taking an
unapologetically aggressive stance, ID seeks to acquire and monetize
intellectual property. Presently, ID touts that it has a portfolio of 3,800
patents and has engaged in worldwide transactions of more than 5,000
patents. 45 Mining intellectual property from universities and others,
specializing in intellectual property dispute resolutions, and providing
intellectual property licenses, ID claims that it is Asia's oldest
intellectual property investment company and the leading intellectual

38 See JETRO, supra note 35.

39 See id.
* See id.
41 See Monroig & Terroir, supra note 15, at 87-89.
42 Id. at 88; WARREN CLARKE & JAMES W. HINTON, DEEP CENTRE, MOBILIZING
NATIONAL INNOVATION ASSETS: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGN PATENT FUNDS 5

(2016), http://deepcentre.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/DEEPCENTRE
MOBILIZINGNATIONALINNOVATONASSETSMAY2016.pdf.
43 Dan Levine & Miyoung Kim, Insight: Nation-States Enter Contentious PatentBuying Business, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2013, 11:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-patents-nations-insightlinsight-nation-states-enter-contentious-patent-buyingbusiness-idusbre92j07b20130320.
44 Joff Wild, Korean Patent Fund Aims for $350 Million War Chest with Goal of
Becoming a Global Player, INTELL. ASSET. MGMT.: BLOG (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=471904ea-c963-4315-b914-6cb600elafe9.
45 About ID, INTELL. DISCOVERY, http://i-discovery.com/site/en/overview/aboutid.jsp
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
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property monetization company. 46 Currently, ID and its affiliates are
managing more than $500 million in transactions based on its arsenal
patent portfolio.4 7 With global market presence and ambition, ID
hoards patents issued beyond Korea's borders. Indeed, more than
eighty percent of the patents assigned to ID are in the United States. 48
These U.S. patents, however, are originally owned by Korean
entities. 49 Also, ID's patents concentrate in areas of significance to
"main industry technology sectors," such as "mobile communication,
semiconductor, network, energy, [and] smart vehicle," among others.
In addition to ID, the Korean government has created a smaller
patent fund called IP Cube Partners based on the initiative
championed by the Korean Intellectual Property Office.50 Both patent
capital funds are the brainchild of the Korean government's policy of
"A Strategy for the Realisation of a Strong Country in IP."51 Ironically,
Korea's SPFs came into existence because the government was
witnessing the global "patent war" of which Korean companies were
forced to become active participants, and the government could no
longer linger on the sidelines.52
Apparently, the two SPFs are not sufficient in meeting Korea's
hunger for patents in the global "patent war" as perceived by the
government. In 2015, two state-owned Korean Banks, the Korea
Development Bank and Industrial Bank of Korea, launched KDB Infra
IP Capital with startup capital of $89 million.53 After its creation, the
new Korean SPF began to aggregate patents in the video coding
technology that was previously owned by the Korean Telecom, KT
Corporation.54 The patent acquisition in 2016 marks the beginning of
that fund's monetization as a licensor in the video coding standard
MPEG LA's HEVC.55
46

Id.; What We Do,

INTELL. DiscovERY,

http://i-discovery.com/site/en/overview/

whatwedo.jsp (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
4 About ID, supra note 45.
48 CLARKE & HINTON, supra note 42, at 5 (analyzing the origins of patents owned
by Intellectual Discovery).
49 Id. at 6.
50 Monroig & Terroir, supra note 15, at 88.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 87-88.
53 Jacob Schindler, New Korean Sovereign Patent Fund Makes Its First Move with
Telecom Patent Investment, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Mar. 25, 2016), http/www.iammedia.com/Blog/detail.aspx?g=43ceb723-9071-4ecf-b6c4-c608e3838e09.

54 Id.
55 Id. MPEG LA's HEVC is a patent portfolio license that "provides [licensees]
access to essential patent rights for the HEVC digital video coding standard" for
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Taiwan's ITRI, MedTech Fund, and IP Bank

The Taiwan Ministry of the Economy announced in April 2011 the
launch of a national intellectual property initiative to support
Taiwanese companies in the intellectual property market.5 6 In August
2011, the government promptly created its first sovereign patent fund,
the Taiwan Medtech Fund, to upgrade and invest in the biotech
industry. Specifically, the fund focuses on financing the development
and commercialization of biomedical devices, equipment, and
pharmaceutical related production.' 7 Three months later, IP BankTaiwan was created by the Industrial Technology Research Institute
("ITRI"), the largest semi-public research center in Taiwan.58
ITRI traces its origin back to 1973 when the Taiwanese government
was determined to assist Taiwanese industries with staying
competitive and sustainable.' 9 ITRI plays a "vital role" in transforming
Taiwan into a high-tech powerhouse. 60 Indeed, a closer look at ITRI
reveals how Taiwan has successfully commercialized the results of its
sponsored research. A study of ITRI conducted by several
researchers 61 showed that Taiwan has effectuated "the common policy
goal of stimulating the commercialization of innovation by
incentivizing university research." 62 Specifically, ITRI's Innovation
Campus serves as an important platform for industry-academia
collaboration, allowing researchers, industry professionals, and
students to engage in "interdisciplinary R&D projects" relating to four
different themes: "Intelligent Hospital Lighting System, Advanced

"increased speed and efficiency in products that encode and decode video for Internet,
television and mobile transmission, reception and use." HEVC Introduction, MPEG LA,
http://www.mpegla.com/main/programs/HEVC/Pages/Intro.aspx (last visited Feb. 26,
2017). The technology also promises "to deliver next generation higher resolution
HDTV video displays for 4K and 8K Ultra High Definition." Id.
56 Monroig & Terroir, supra note 15, at 90.
57 Talk of the Day Taiwan Medtech Fund Draws Keen Interest, Focus TAIWAN
(Aug. 17, 2011, 11:08 PM), http://focustaiwan.tw/news/atod/201108170045.aspx.
58 Monroig & Terroir, supra note 15, at 89.
59 See About Us, INDUS. TECH. RES. INST., https://www.itri.org.tw/eng/Content/
Messagess/contents.aspx?SitelD=1&MmmlD=617731521661672477 (last visited Feb.
26, 2017) [hereinafter About Us, ITRI].
60

Id.

Paul C.B. Liu et al., Successful Factorsfor Commercializing the Results of Research
and Development in Emerging Economies - a Preliminary Study of ITRI in Taiwan, in
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION 549, 549-59 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A.
Paredes eds., 2011).
61

62

F. Scott

Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, Introduction, in PERSPECTIVES
5 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012).

COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION

ON
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Minimally Invasive Surgery System, Intelligent Vision System, and
Automated Driving Vehicle System." 63 ITRI emphasizes that its
platform aims "to explore emerging technologies and accelerate
economy transformation."64 ITRI prizes its successes, including the
Thomson Reuters Top 100 Global Innovator award bestowed to ITRI
in 2014.65
With respect to IP Bank-Taiwan, ITRI is the originator of the bank.
Consistent with the SPF's strategies, the bank aims to provide funding
to defend domestic companies in international patent infringement
litigation, to prevent foreign global companies from acquiring critical
patent technologies, and to assist private companies in aggregating
patents needed for international competition. 66
Strategically, ITRI has been involved in many technology transfers,
spin-outs, and start-ups. 67 By some reports, ITRI has lately embarked
in a different direction, as it has accumulated a significantly large
portfolio of 19,000 patents. 68 Recently, with the massive patent
arsenal, ITRI has brought patent infringement suits against LG
Corporation and other companies in the Eastern District of Texas. 69
Notably, in the suit against LG, the court noted that "ITRI did not

63 ITRI Innovation Campus Built to Strengthen Academia-Industry Tie, INDUS. TECH.
RES. INST. (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.itri.org.tw/eng/Content/NewsLetter/contents.
aspx?&SitelD=1&MmmlD=617731531241750114&SSize=10&SYear=2016&Keyword
=&MSID=707251145776763010.
64 Id.

65 See About Us, ITRI, supra note 59.
66 Monroig & Terroir, supranote 15, at 90.

67 Joff Wild, The Truth About a "Foreign Troll"; Qualcomm Double Whammy; Top
Deal-Making Tips; and Much More on IPBC Asia 2014 Day Three, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.:

BLOG (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.iam-media.com/BlogfDetail.aspx?g=d312aa08-3a574149-afe8-655e9d7503b8 (reporting that in 2013, "ITRI was involved in 681 tech
transfer deals and was behind 244 spin-outs and start-ups").
68 Bill Gerber, Congress Must Protect CT Biz from Gov't-Sponsored Patent Trolls,
HARTFORD Bus. (Dec. 15, 2014), http/www.hartfordbusiness.com/article/20141215/
printedition/312129956; Howard Williams, The U.S. Supreme Court Hopes to Limit Patent
Trolling, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:36 PM), http/www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/
2014/08/04/the-u-s-supreme-court-hopes-to-limit-patent-trolling/#5129f9bc5c62
(stating
that ITRI's patent portfolio contains just under 19,000 patents).
69 Curt Bramble, Patent Trolls Spell Trouble for America's Economy, REUTERS (Nov. 18,
2013),
httpi/blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/1 118/patent-trolls-spell-trouble-foramericas-economy (stating that "ITRI has asserted more than 20 patents in the Eastern
District of Texas U.S. District Court"); Patrick Rosenstiel, Patent Trolls Must Be Addressed in
Trade Talks, MINNPosT (July 8, 2015), httpsI/www.minnpost.com/communityvoices/2015/07/patent-trolls-must-be-addressed-trade-talks (raising concerns about ITRI
and its litigation against LG).
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have any real business presence in the United States." 70 Consequently,
ITRI has been attacked as a global patent troll in the United States.7 1
On the other hand, ITRI has earned praise for its role as a public
research institute in "the latecomer country" adeptly evolving from "a
facilitator in the catching up phase," from the 1970s to 1990s, "to
become a mediator" in the global patent and innovation market since
the 2000s. 72

D.

China's Ruichuan IPR Funds, Beijing Key Industry IP Operations
Fund, and Sichuan IP OperationsFund

As a latecomer to intellectual property law, China has quickly erased
its old piracy standing.7 3 The government has implemented many
national policies to modernize intellectual property laws and focus on
innovation.74 In 2014, China stoked fear in the patent market by
establishing the Ruichuan IPR Funds.75 Some reported that China has
funneled an impressive sum of $50 billion to Ruichuan. 76 Ruichuan
70 Rosenstiel, supra note 69.
71 See id.
72 Jyh-Wen Shiu et al., The Dynamic Effect of Knowledge Capitals in the Public
Research Institute: Insights from Patenting Analysis of ITRI (Taiwan) and ETRI (Korea),
98 SCIENTOMETRICS 2051, 2051 (2014).
73 China's attitude towards intellectual property has changed significantly in
recent years. In fact, China has already become the number one nation in trademark
registrations, as its economy today is the second largest. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The
World's Trademark Powerhouse: A Critique of China's New Trademark Law, 40 SEATTLE

U. L. REv. 901, 904 (2017). Additionally, China has asserted its new global power by
formulating and dictating new trade agreements with less-developed countries. See,
e.g., Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 UC DAvIs L. REv. 953, 956-61 (2011).
74 Daniel A. Filstrup, China's Patent Subsidies and the U.S. Response, 42 AIPLA Q.J.
605, 609 (2014) (discussing China's innovation goals of having "two million annual
patent filings by 2015 and to quadruple the number of Chinese-origin patent
applications filing abroad by 2020"); Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and
Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 416, 445 (discussing China's promotion
of "Indigenous Innovation" and "National Medium and Long-Term Plan for the
Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020)").
75 Zoe Bollinger, Rising Powers in Chinese IP: A Look at Ruichuan IPR Funds, LINKEDIN
(Apr. 22, 2015), httpsI/www.linkedin.com/pulse/rising-powers-chinese-ip-look-ruichuanipr-funds-zoe-bollinger; Peter Roff, The FrighteningEmergence of Government Patent Trolls,
WASH. TIMEs (Aug. 31, 2014), http//www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/augf31/roffthat the Chinese
(commenting
the-frightening-emergence-of-govemment-paten
government's Ruichuan IPR Fund represents a new effort to "acquire the intellectual
capital of American companies. . . to eliminate its competitors").
76 William J. Watkins, Jr., China Declares War on U.S. Intellectual Property, Gets
into the Patent Trolling Business, DAILY CALLER (Oct. 8, 2014, 11:13 AM),
http://dailycaller.com/2014/10/08/china-declares-war-on-u-s-intellectual-property-
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uses the sum to acquire patents. Some commentators warn that
Ruichuan's patent portfolio will be massive and the patents will be
used in infringement actions against U.S. companies and others.77
Ruichuan has stated that its patent acquisition is for defensive
purposes to protect Chinese companies. That means Ruichuan will
engage in investments in third party R&D and collaboration with
universities and research institutions to acquire intellectual property.7 8
But with the build-up patent portfolio, Ruichuan is no doubt
positioning itself in a key role to potentially block foreign companies
from entering the Chinese market, as many continue to fear.79
In practice, Ruichuan is aggressive in protecting Chinese domestic
companies, such as the mobile phone manufacturer Xiaomi, the
electronic appliances manufacturer TCL, the software company
Kingsoft, and others, by helping them "pave their way into overseas
markets."80 Ruichuan also builds up its patent holding through direct
investment in third party research and development. 8' Moreover,
Ruichuan relies on patent brokers, including China Technology
Exchange ("CTEX"), to facilitate its efforts in patent acquisitions in
the areas of smart devices and mobile internet.8 2 Ironically, despite
being a public SPF, in executing its patent fund goals Ruichuan has
hired several former executives from Intellectual Ventures to be on
Ruichuan's management team. 83
Two years after the creation of Ruichuan, the Chinese Central
government and provincial governments jointly created and funded
two new SPFs: the Beijing Key Industry IP Operations Fund and the
Sichuan IP Operations Fund. 84 The two funds received 1.7 billion

&

gets-into-the-patent-trolling-business.
77 Id.
78 Bollinger, supranote 75.
79 Id.
80 Jack Ellis, Inside the Multi-Million Dollar Chinese Patent Buying Fund with IV
Connections, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (June 19, 2014), httpi/www.iam-media.com/
BlogfDetail.aspx?g--48293ab7-ebl7-423b-8cc3-fbdac475e943&vl=1369394997
(quoting
an intellectual property executive at a Chinese corporation regarding Ruichuan's defensive
objective).
8] Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. ("The entity's general manager is Lin Peng, a former executive director of
patent licensing at Intellectual Ventures who has also held roles at Microsoft and
Cargill, among others. Lin is also president and chief operating officer at Zhigu IP, the
firm that is behind the creation of Ruichuan. Zhigu's chairman is Zhang Hongjiang,
who is also CEO of internet business Kingsoft. (It is also worth noting that the head of
IP at Xiaomi, Zhang Liang, is another IV alumnus.)")
84 China Launches Intellectual Property Operations Funds, CCPIT PAT.
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yuan, or $245 million, to focus on intellectual property services to key
industrial enterprises.8 5 Their goals are to cultivate companies with
strong patent prospects, engage in foreign patent infringement
86
litigation and defensive acquisition, and invest in patent navigation.
E.

France'sFonds Souverain de la ProprieteIntellectuelle and France
Brevets

Asian countries are not the only nations with sovereign patent funds
in the hyperbolically-branded global patent war. Across the continent,
the French government studied the patent and innovation market,
then announced the creation of a sovereign patent fund called Fonds
Souverain de la Proprifte Intellectuelle ("FSPI").87 France provided
100 million euro to fund FSPI. 88 With these resources, FSPI will
operate the fund with its main objective of "acquiring rights on
blocking patents" to defend domestic companies from patent
lawsuits. 89 FSPI, however, is not the only type of SPF created by the
French government.
The first SPF was France Brevets,90 created in September 2010 with
purposes to acquire patent rights from public and private sources, to
license the patents, and to increase the intellectual property income to
the original patent owner. 91 In naming the fund "France Brevets,"
which literally means "France Patents," the government openly
implemented its patent aggregation policy under the rubric of
innovation. 92 The government believes that the patent portfolio is a

TRADEMARK L. OFF. (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/node/2888.
85

Id.

86

Id.
See Jean-Christophe Rolland & Philippe Kohn, France: New Sovereign Patent

87

Fund,

MANAGING

INTELL.

PROP.

(Jan.

26,

2015),

http://www.managingip.com/

Article/3421356/France-New-sovereign-patent-fund.html.
88
89

See id.
Id.

90 See Agence du Patrimoine Immateriel de I'tat, Creation de France Brevets,
PORTAIL DE L'ECONOMIE, DES FINANCES, DE L'ACTION ET DES COMPTES PUBLICS (Jan.

LE

20,

2012), https://www.economie.gouv.fr/apie/creation-france-brevets.
91 Hedge Funds and Sovereign Wealth Funds Emerge as New Players Entering
Intellectual Property Market, HEDGEWEEK
(Dec.
15,
2015,
3:22 PM),
http://www.hedgeweek.com/2015/12/15/234806/hedge-funds-and-sovereign-wealthfunds-emerge-new-players-entering-intellectual-pr (discussing sovereign patent funds,
including France Brevets, as an IP business model).
92 See Michael J. Meurer & James Bessen, Congress Needs to Rein in Patent Trolls, Bos.
GLOBE (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/04/congress-needsrein-patent-trolls/BSulTBqcU1 lmtYLrqSK6yO/story.html?comments=all&sort=highest
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reflection of French innovation from a wide range of industries that
others must pay a fee to use. Since its creation, the fund has produced
"significant results in licensing out initiatives." 93 Through its
aggressive approach, France Brevets has forced international
companies to pay hefty license fees for the use of its patents.
11.

SPF PATENT LITIGATION AND LICENSING CAMPAIGN

Among the SPFs, France Brevets has emerged as the aggressive
leader in monetizing patents through a well-coordinated patent
litigation and licensing campaign. Though Korea and Japan's SPFs
have been mentioned as involved in patent litigation, their efforts,
however, are timid compared to France Brevets. 94
With expert assistance, France Brevets has simultaneously engaged
in patent litigation in Germany and the United States.95 According to a
declaratory judgment complaint filed in the Northern District of
California, France Brevets has an alter-ego called NFCT, a Delaware
limited liability corporation, created solely for the purpose of litigating
patent cases. 96 NFCT has no other assets, except the patents that it has
received through a special arrangement from INSIDE Secure, the
original owner of the two patents. 9 7 INSIDE Secure is one of French's

leading technology companies, owning the valuable near field
communication ("NFC") patents.9 8 The company teamed up with
France Brevets for a licensing arrangement wherein France Brevets
exploits the NFC patents and shares the royalties with INSIDE
Secure.99

rating (expressing concerns about France Brevets functioning like a patent troll); FR.

BREVETS, http//www.francebrevets.com/en (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
93 Rolland & Kohn, supra note 87.
94 See Jack Ellis, Patents Linked to South Korea's Intellectual Discovery Asserted in
Eastern Texas Litigation, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.iam-

media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e5c2b3e8-3c40-4d9d-836d-6becd3Off5 16 [hereinafter
Patents Linked to Intellectual Discovery].
95 Joff Wild, FranceBrevets Success in Germany Shows Just How Wrong Bessen and
Meurer Are,

INTELL.

AsSET

MGMT.:

BLOG

(Apr.

5,

2015),

http://www.iam-

media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=bcf19422-6ee9-45d4-965b-b2e3979bc4e6
(discussing
France Brevets's litigation strategies in Germany and the United States).
96 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 2, NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc. v. Fr.
Brevets, S.A.S., No. C 14-1225 SI (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2014), 2014 WL 4621017, at *1.
97 Id. at 2-3.

98 Nick Flaherty, INSIDE Secure in NFC Patent Licensing Deal with France Brevets,
EENEWs EUR. (June 21, 2012), http://www.eenewseurope.com/news/inside-secure-nfcpatent-licensing-deal-france-brevets.
99 Id.
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France Brevets acquired the worldwide patent rights from INSIDE
Secure in order to wage the "near field communication patent
licensing program" in June 2013.100 With respect to the United States,
the patent agreement between France Brevets and INSIDE Secure was
recorded with the United States Patent and Trademark Office on
October 1, 2013.101 The following month, France Brevets formed NFC
Technology ("NFCT") in Delaware with its principal office in
Marshall, Texas, 102 a known birthplace of the famed "rocket-docket"
Eastern District of Texas.10 3 The selection of the forum known for
patent litigation is consistent with the campaign to monetize patents.
France Brevets also became the sole manager of NFCT and its
litigation efforts.10 Not surprisingly, Jean Charles Hourcade serves as
both the CEO of NFCT and the Managing Director of France
Brevets. 105 With the structure in place, France Brevets facilitated
INSIDE Secure to assign additional patent rights directly to NFCT in
November 2013.106
With these patent rights in hand, France Brevets initiated its
licensing campaign. One of its tactics is to approach customers of
alleged infringers about the licensing and enforcement of France
Brevets and NFCT patents obtained from INSIDE Secure. 107 France
Brevets typically includes patent claim charts of infringement in its
licensing approach. 0 8 In addition to the United States, France Brevets
has approached others for licensing in Europe.1 09 When entities in the
United States and Europe refuse France Brevets's licensing efforts, the
SPF follows with lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions and nations on the
same date.
For example, on December 5, 2013, France Brevets filed claims
against LG Electronics, Deutschland GmbH, and HTC Germany
GmbH in Dusseldorf, Germany, for infringement of patents that are

100 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 96, at 4.
101

Id. at 4.

Id. at 2, 4.
See, e.g., Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A CriticalLook at
Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017); XuanThao Nguyen, Justice Scalia's "Renegadejurisdiction": Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83
TUL. L. REV. 111 (2008).
104 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 96, at 5.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 5-6.
108 Id.
102

103

109

Id.
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the European counterpart of the U.S. patents." 0 On the same date,
across the Atlantic, NFCT filed claims against LG Electronics USA,
Inc., LG Electronics Mobilecomm, and HTC America, Inc. for
infringements of the same patents in the Eastern District of Texas."1
Four days later, France Brevets announced in its press release that it
had filed patent infringement suits against LG and HTC in both the
United States and Germany.11 2 Because LG and HTC are customers of
NXP, NXP then filed a declaratory judgment action of
noninfringement and invalidity against France Brevets in the Northern
District of California.1 13
Eight months later, in August 2014, LG agreed to pay a worldwide
royalty for a license to use France Brevets's near field communication
patent in LG Electronics's smartphone products.11 4 The LG license was
a very important victory for France Brevets's licensing program,
marking the SPF's first global patent licensing success. France Brevets
became emboldened in its focused efforts on monetizing patents at a
global level.
Subsequently, in April 2016, France Brevets reached additional
licensing milestones by getting Sony to agree to a worldwide royaltybearing license to use the near field communication patents in Sony's
products.115 Also, in December 2016, Sanofi-Aventis agreed to enter
into a royalty-bearing license for using France Brevets patents relating
to Air Flow in Sanofi-Aventis's ventilation systems.116
On the litigation front, France Brevets scored a victory against HTC in
early 2016. The German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht) in
Munich ruled in France Brevets's favor on the validity of the asserted
patents." 7

110 Id. at 6.
11, Id.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 1, 6.
114 France Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to LG Electronics as Its First Licensee, FR.
BREVETS (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/FB-signsLGERELEASE_18TH%20AUGUST.pdf.
115 France Brevet Licenses NFC Patents to Sony, FR. BREVETS (Apr. 4, 2016),
http//www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/France%20Brevet%20Licenses%20NFC%
20Patents%2Oto%2oSony-eng.pdf.
116 Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH Enters AIR FLOW Patent Licensing Program,
FR. BREVETS (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/
SANOFILICENCE-PR.pdf.
117 Court Decision on Validity Against HTC in Germany in the NFC Patent Disputes
with France Brevets, FR. BREVETS (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.francebrevets.com/
sites/default/files/RELEASEJAN%2022%202016_FRANCEBREVETS.pdf.
112
113
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What France Brevets has achieved with its patent assertions and
licensing is carefully watched by other SPFs. France Brevets's 2014
victory in patent assertion, resulting in LG global licensing payments,
was widely reported.11 8 By 2015, Japan's SPF decided to no longer sit
on the sideline watching.
On July 24, 2015, Japan's IP Bridge filed a complaint against TCL, a
Chinese company, and its affiliate and wholly-owned subsidiary in the
United States for infringement of IP Bridge's patents.11 9 IP Bridge
initiated the litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Delaware because it alleged that the defendants' mobile devices under
the Alcatel OneTouch brand infringed on its essential patents.1 20 The
decision to litigate in the United States underscores IP Bridge's
willingness to pursue infringers regardless of nationality. In fact, IP
Bridge brought the litigation against TCL after it had sent four
separate letters to TCL about the infringement, but TCL ignored them
all. 121 IP Bridge's behavior seems to follow what France Brevets has
done: pursuing litigation when negotiation is either nonexistent or
fails after months of discussion.1 22
The patents in the suit asserted by IP Bridge were originally
Panasonic's patents. IP Bridge aggregated several hundred patents
from Panasonic back in 2013 when IP Bridge was first established.1 23
IP Bridge brought a second patent infringement action against
Broadcom, a Singapore company, in early 2016 for infringement of six
118 See generally Jack Ellis, France Brevets License Deal with LG Electronics a
"Milestone", Says Senior Fund Executive, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Sept. 1, 2014),
http//www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=604614dc-555e-4322-b6cb-4e6452643733;
Richard Handford, France Brevets Resolves NFC Patent Dispute with LG, MOBILE WORLD
LIVE (Aug. 19, 2014), httpsi/www.mobileworldlive.com/money/news-money/francebrevets-resolves-nfc-patent-dispute-1g; France Brevets Licenses NFC Patents to Samsung,
2016), https://www.insidesecure.com/Company/Press(May 30,
INSIDE SECURE
releasesfFrance-Brevets-licenses-NFC-Patents-to-Samsung.
119 Complaint at 1-3, Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings
Ltd., No. 1:15-CV-00634 (D. Del. filed July 24, 2015) [hereinafter IP Bridge
Complaint].
120
121

Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 7-8.

122 Jacob Schindler, Japan's Sovereign Patent Fund Initiates First Legal Action in the US,
Accusing TCL of Infringing Three SEPs, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Sept. 3, 2015),
http//www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=c67fb03e-c954-4e9e-8a3 1-dd0f6c32834e
("[T]he French SPF told IAM earlier this year that it only pursues litigation when there is
no movement in negotiations: 'For example, when after sharing a lot of information about
our patents and the financial scheme we are offering, we have not received any counteroffer after several months of discussion.' This is similar to the situation apparently faced by
IP Bridge in trying to establish a dialogue with TCL.").
123

Id.
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patents. Five out of the six asserted patents are from Panasonic.1 24
Similar to the second patent suit, IP Bridge filed its third litigation
based on patents from Panasonic against OmniVision Technologies in
the district court of Delaware.125 These cases are still pending.
Korea's SPF, Intellectual Discovery, despite owning many patents,
has been rather quiet on the litigation front. It has been reported that
ID assigned its rights to three patents to a newly created company in
Texas, Game and Technology Co., Ltd., in January 2015.126 Game and
Technology then filed a patent infringement suit in the Eastern
District of Texas against Blizzard Entertainment, Riot Games, Valve,
and Wargamingnet. 127 The case was transferred to the Central District
of California and then dismissed three months after the transfer.1 28
Korea's ID is not involved in any other litigation.
While Japan and Korea's SPFs are on the timid side of patent
assertion through costly litigations, Taiwan's ITRI has taken a much
stronger stance. "ITRI has initiated more than 15 patent infringement
suits against foreign companies," including tech giants like LG and
Samsung.1 29 Overall, with respect to litigation, France, Japan, Korea,
and Taiwan's SPFs have all resorted to litigation in extracting patent
licenses. However, the patent litigation strategy thus far has benefitted
only France Brevets, as it is the only entity with a licensing victory.
III.

CONDEMNING SPFs As PATENT TROLLS?

"Patent troll" is a pejorative term used to label a non-practicing
entity for enforcing its patent assets against alleged infringers through
litigation and licensing tactics that are deemed unduly opportunistic,
having no intention, plan, nor capability of practice for the patented
invention.1 30 For some, a patent troll means an entity asserting patents
124 Jack Ellis, Japanese Public-Private Patent Fund Initiates Second Assertion
Campaign; Targets Post-MergerBroadcom, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Feb. 25, 2016),
httpJ/www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=2f3f67cd-e559-4c39-92c4-2e6b98eefd21.
125 Jack Ellis, New IP Bridge Suit Highlights How Sovereign Patent Funds Have Entered a
New Phase in Their Development, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Apr. 26, 2016),
httpJ/www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=9ccOad82-Obb2-4889-a78c-f22135276cd7.
126 Ellis, Patents Linked to Intellectual Discovery, supra note 94.
127 Id.
128 Complaint, Game & Tech. Co. v. Wargaming.net LLP, No. 2:16-CV-06554CBM-PLA (E.D. Tex. filed July 9, 2015), https://insight.rpxcorp.comAitigation
documents/12134205.
129 Ryan Ellis, The Secret Plan to Kill Free Trade, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2014, 10:43
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanellis/2014/03/27/the-secret-plan-to-kill-freetrade/#2elb48fd62d4.
130 See Chrimar Sys., Inc. v. Foundry Networks, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 2d 918, 926
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in lawsuits to extract license fees. 13 1 For others, patent trolls dampen
innovation.1 32 Some would assert broadly any entity that does not
practice patents, like universities and research institutes, may as well
be deemed a patent troll.1 33 One thing is clear, from Wikipedia to the
media and scholars, there are now many variations of the meaning of
"patent troll" because the patent market has become quite complex
and remains attractive to many new and different types of nonpracticing entities.1 34 Regardless of the variance, the term "patent
135
troll" conjures a negative image of extortion.
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (noting the definition of patent troll). See generally Energy Heating,
LLC v. Heat On-The-Fly, LLC, No. 4:13-CV-10, 2015 WL 11143139, at *1 (D.N.D.
Aug. 13, 2015) (instructing the parties to "avoid all terms that are not only pejorative
but, like 'patent troll', actually contain a legal conclusion"); Jason Rantanen, Slaying
the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 163-69 (2006) (tracing the history of the label
"patent troll" and noting the difficulty of applying that label to different categories of
patent holders).
131 See Julien Penin, Strategic Uses of Patentsin Marketsfor Technology: A Story of Fabless
Firms, Brokers and Trolls, 84J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 633, 633 (2012) (discussing the origin
of the term "patent troll" and the concern over the development of patent trolls). Justice
Kennedy is among those noting that "[a]n industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citing FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION

AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY, ch. 3, 38-39 (Oct. 2003), https//www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-andpatent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf.
132 See generally BrianJ. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could
a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L.
REv. 1309, 1310-12 (2013) (proclaiming that the impact of patent trolls "on
innovation may be the most important empirical question in patent law today");
Dustin Volz, White House on Patent Trolls: It's Your Turn, Congress, NAT'LJ. (Feb. 21,
2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/61718/white-house-patent-trolls-its-yourturn-congress?mref=mostread-3.
133 For example, see Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings:
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571,
1577-78 (2009) thereinafter Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings], using the term
"NPE" instead of "patent troll" upon recognition that the term "NPE generally refers
to a patentee that does not make products or 'practice' its inventions. Over time, the
definition has narrowed to exclude actors in the innovation enterprise who engage in
significant research and development activities and individual inventors who seek to
commercialize their inventions.")
134 John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristicsof the
Most-Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 tbl.1 (2009) (indicating that among
the twelve classes of patent plaintiffs, eleven are trolls or non-practicing entities);
Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and
Its Implicationsfor the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 320 (2010) (observing that
patent
there are many kinds of non-practicing entities, "each with its own ...
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According to Electronic Frontier Foundation's ("EFF's") narrative, a
patent troll uses patents as "weapons" in the business of threatening
and bringing litigation. 136 The patent troll purchases patents at low
cost from down-trodden companies who have nothing left, except
patents.1 37 But these purchased patents should never be issued by the
USPTO in the first place, EFF laments, because they are too broad,
38
lack novelty, and are "not revolutionary."s
The narrative continues
that with its potent weapons, the patent troll searches for its victims
and then sends them threatening letters wherein the troll demands a
licensing fee.13 9 The victims comply because the fees are significantly
smaller than the litigation cost, even though they believe the patents
are "bogus" and their products "did not infringe."1 40 Similar narratives
permeate popular culture.141 From Congress to the media, many are
ready to condemn patent trolls.14 2 Soon, patent trolls will become the

strategy"); Gene Quinn, In Search of a Definition for the Term "Patent Troll,"
IPWATCHDOG (July 18, 2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/18/definitionpatent-troll/id= 11700.
135 Feldman & Ewing, supra note 1, at 1 ("Troll activity is generally reviled by
operating companies as falling somewhere between extortion and a drag on
innovation.").
136 Patent Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/resourcespatent-troll-victims (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
137 Id.
138 Id. The patentability requirements under patent law do not require
"revolutionary" ideas, but the invention must be novel and nonobvious, in addition to
patentable subject matter, utility, and enablement. See 35 U.S.C. Hi 101-103, 112
(2018). Among the patentability requirements, the nonobviousness doctrine plays a
pivotal role of weeding out trivial advances and ensuring only substantial advances are
entitled to patent protection. Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal
Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 912
(2007); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So Obvious After All: Patent
Law's Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV.
41, 42-43 (2012).
139 Patent Trolls, supra note 136.
140 Id.; see also Robin M. Davis, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls:
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform
Act of 2005 and eBay v. MercExchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 431-32
(2008) (noting that "[c] onveniently, the licensing fee is calculated to be less than the
cost of a legal defense").
141 Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and Patent Reform,
19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113, 113 (2015) (analyzing how the media has consistently
used the term "patent troll" to negatively portray all non-practicing patent entities
without understanding patent law on ownership).
142 Both federal and state legislatures have either proposed or enacted some
legislation aimed at curbing patent trolls. See e.g., Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringements, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, H§ 4195-4199 (2013); Patent Transparency and
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public enemy, the cause of patent systemic ills, the reason for patent
reforms and proposals for more reforms. 143
Given all the negative associations with "patent trolls," scholars and
experts are not hesitant to brand France Brevets, IP Bridge, ID,
Ruichuan IPR Funds, and other SPFs as patent trolls. 144 Some experts
dismissively vocalize that as long as SPFs are engaging in suing anyone
for patent infringement, the SPFs are "trolling."14 5
Upon a careful review of SPFs and their activities, the negative label
"patent trolls" is perhaps unwarranted. First, SPFs are not in the
business of patent litigation. For instance, even France Brevets, as the
most litigious SPF by far, employs a business model wherein the entity
works with inventors to obtain patents, bears the cost of patent
licensing
through
commercializes
then
and
procurement,
enforcement.1 46 The original patentees continue to own the patents

Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309,
113th Cong. (2013); Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act
of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1540, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014). The
American Invents Act, of course, aims at controlling patent trolls. Sara Jeruss et al.,
The America Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 357, 358-60 (2012) (stating that patent trolls are the system's

"modern villains" and discussing provisions in the AIA aimed at patent trolls).
143 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls,
113 COLUM. L. REv. 2117, 2124 (2013) ("[T]rolls cost the economy $500 billion over
the last twenty years, mostly in the IT industry. Other reports suggest that patent
trolls inhibit innovation at the firms they sue."); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing
Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341, 368, 384 (2010) ("[Patent trolls] tend to exploit
litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents from
commercializers."). But see Kristen Osenga, Sticks and Stones: How the FTC's NameCalling Misses the Complexity of Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 1001, 1005-10 (2015) (advocating for a better understanding of patent licensing
firms and how these firms affect innovation and competition).
144 David Balto, State-Sponsored Patent Trolls Signal New Form of Protectionism, ROLL
16, 2013, 1:21 PM), http//www.rollcall.com/news/state-sponsored
CALL (Sept.
Letter
patenttrollssignal newforim ofprotectionismCommentary-227649-1.html;
from Stephen DeMaura, President, Americans for Job Sec. et al. to the Fed. Trade Comm'n
(Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-comments/
2013/12/00058-87866.pdf- Levine & Kim, supranote 43.
145 Levine & Kim, supra note 43 (reporting experts' views on SPFs and trolling
behaviors).
146 France Brevets can find support among IBM, GE, and MOSAID, the formerly
manufacturing companies that have been very aggressive in commercializing their
patents through licensing programs. See Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing
Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REv. 435, 440, 466 (2014)
(advocating that formerly manufacturing companies, such as IBM, GE, and MOSAID,
should not be condemned as patent trolls because they are providing benefits for the
commercialization of their technology).
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and receive a share of the royalty fees obtained by France Brevets. 147
Through careful and efficient licensing, France Brevets selects quality
patents for its licensing and enforcing efforts.148 Moreover, LG and
HTC are sophisticated multinational companies, and they are not troll
victims without resources to vigorously fight back against France
Brevets in court. France Brevets resorts to litigation, as seen in the two
cases against LG and HTC in Europe and the United States, only when
numerous negotiations fail.14 9 Consequently, it was successful in
50
achieving a settlement and receiving a court victory.o
The two cases
are the only litigations France Brevets has ever initiated. Japan's IP
Bridge and Korea's ID are slow in embracing patent litigation, and thus
far they have seen no results from their pending suits, as patent
litigations are notoriously expensive and unpredictable.151 In sum,
these SPFs do not rely on patent litigation to prey on victims as their
modus operandi, and the alleged infringers, in the few cases that SPFs
have brought against them, do not fit the victimology of the patent
troll narrative.
Second, SPFs like France Brevets are not purchasing patents from
down-trodden companies for extraction. France Brevets acquires
patent rights from innovators who have devoted significant research
and development resources to generating their patents, yet have not
been able to assert their patent rights. For example, Frances Brevets
works with Onera, the French aerospace research agency with more
52
than 2,000 employees, including 1,500 scientists and engineers,1 to

147 What We Do, FR. BREVETS, http://www.francebrevets.com/en/what-we-do
visitedJan. 13, 2017).
148 Id.

(last

149 Id.

150 Court Decision on Validity Against HTC in Germany in the NFC Patent Dispute
with France Brevets, FR. BREVETS (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.francebrevets.
com/sites/default/files/RELEASEJAN%2022%202016 FRANCEBREVETS.pdf.
151 Moreover, today's great attention on patent litigation explosion apparently has
little support because the patent system of "the mid-to-late nineteenth century was in
some ways more litigious than that of the early twenty-first." Christopher Beauchamp,
The FirstPatent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE LJ. 848, 851 (2016). "Balancing out the
reform-minded commentators is another set of historically informed scholars, for
whom the commotions of the past provide reason to be sanguine about the present. In
this view, 'historical amnesia' has contributed to an unjustified sense that the travails
of the current patent system are unprecedented and frightening. The long history of
patent struggles and even their association with technological progress should counsel
us against legislative or judicial overreaction. This is especially so given that the level
of litigation does not seem unduly high by past standards." Id. at 942.
152 Identity, ONERA, https://www.onera.fr/en/identity (last visitedJan. 3, 2018).
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take advantage of Onera's technology for licensing purposes. 153 France
Brevets teamed up with global companies, such as Airbus and
Ericsson, to found IP Europe to assert patent rights originated from
many innovative entities. 5 4 IP Europe receives support from
innovators such as Alstom, the Fraunhofer Institute, Orange, research
55
institutes, and European small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Likewise, Korea's ID acquires its patents from individuals, universities,
and research entities, as well as prominent companies.1 56 Japan's IP
Bridge similarly received 836 patents from Panasonic, 100 from NEC,
57
and 88 from Sanyo, according to U.S. patent assignments data.
Taiwan's ITRI has sponsored numerous research projects and worked
with many innovators and SMEs in its efforts of amassing patents.1 58
China's Ruichuan IPR also works with third-party institutes to acquire
patents.1 59 In sum, these SPFs are working with innovative enterprises,
which are no different from the U.S. entities that legal scholars have
come to recognize as not being patent trolls.160 These innovative

Onera and France Brevets join Forces to Expand Onera's Patent Valuation, FR.
(July 16, 2012), http://www.francebrevets.com/sites/default/files/201207valorisation-Onera-France-brevets.pdf.
154 IP Europe Press Release, FR. BREVETS (Jan. 26, 2016), httpI/www.francebrevets.
com/sites/default/files/Press%20Release%201P%20EuropeEN.PDF [hereinafter IP Europe].
Airbus and Ericsson are no different from Conversant, once known as a producer of
semiconductor and computer memory technology, it commercializes its patent portfolio.
See Our Portfolio, CONVERSANT, httpJ/www.conversantip.com/our-portfolio (last visited
Feb. 26, 2017). Likewise, GE acquires many patents and does not "necessarily make a
product for every patent they eventually assert against another entity." GE's IP Counsel
Takes a Surprising Position on So-Called "Patent Trolls," RiCH GOLDSTEIN (Apr. 8, 2013),
http//www.richgoldstein.com/2013/04/08/ge-ip-counsel-takes-a-surprising-position-onpatent-trolls. Similarly, IBM converted from a technology manufacturing company to a
global licensor with more than $1 billion royalty revenue a year. David Kirkpatrick, The
Future of IBM, FORTUNE (Feb. 18, 2002), http//www.archive.fortune.com/magazines/
fortune/fortunearchive/2002/02/18/318158/index.htm (stating that the shift in business
model from product manufacturing to patent licensing allows IBM to become "the world
leader in new patents; it earns well over $1 billion a year licensing those patents").
153

BREVETS

155
156

IP Europe, supra note 154.
About ID, supra note 45.

157 Jack Ellis,JapaneseSovereign Patent Fund Gains Momentum with Two Big Deals in
the Past Week, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (June 2, 2015), http://www.iammedia.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=3a280eb6-778f-4bb4-bed4-aeb78682aala.
158

159

See supra Subpart I.C.
See supra Subpart I.D.

160 See Chien, supra note 133, at 1578 (noting that the shift in the patent troll or
NPE definition has narrowed "to exclude actors in the innovation enterprise who
engage in significant research and development activities and individual inventors
who seek to commercialize their inventions"); see also Osenga, supra note 146, at 440
(advocating that former manufacturing companies, such as IBM, GE, and MOSAID,
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enterprises want to commercialize their patented inventions, reaping
the benefits of their research, development, and investments.
Third, some SPFs are not aggregating and asserting patents for their
own profits. France Brevets returns a "significant part" of the profits
back to the original inventors who continue to own the patents while
granting France Brevets the right to enforce the patents on their
behalf. There exists a strong belief in France that these inventors have
been treated unfairly by others who use their technologies without
compensation.1 61 France Brevets fills the gap by bringing fair
compensation back to original inventors through its efficient licensing
efforts.162 Korea's ID is slightly different; it wants to stimulate an
emerging IP business in Asia. It actively invests in start-ups and
ventures to develop new ideas and procure high-quality patents. 163 ID
rewards inventors by adding value to invention through an IP R&D
program and paying inventors for their IP assets. 164 Accordingly, ID

has engaged in transactions of more than 5,000 patents with its
investment fund of more than $500 million but currently does not
have any pending litigation anywhere.1 65 Again, these SPFs' conduct is
different from the patent trolls' behavior, which is widely condemned
by critics, as seen in the narrative described by the Electronic Frontier
Foundation.
Most importantly, a new trend among SPFs has recently emerged.
For instance, IP Bridge stresses to the public that it has moved
beyond its original goals of facilitating open innovation and patent
aggregation. 166 The company has signed a drug discovery deal with
Kyushu University to conduct research and development on
"microcapsule technology consisting of silica porous materials" for a

should not be condemned as patent trolls because they are providing benefits for the
commercialization of their technology). See generally Christopher A. Cotropia et al.,
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649 (2014) (examining
beyond the simple PAE or non-PAE distinction and identifying a new group of patent
holders as new entrants in the patent system).
161 See What We Do, supra note 147.
162 How We Work, FR. BREVETS, http://www.francebrevets.com/en/how-we-work
(last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
163 About ID, supra note 45.
164 What We Do, supra note 147.
165 About ID, supra note 45.
166 Jack Ellis, Japanese SPF Sends Message that It Is More than just a Patent Assertion
Entity with New Drug Discovery Collaboration, INTELL. ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Nov. 3,
2016),
http://www.iam-media.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=2912745a-ae5O-4a2a-9a002f24d1591e0b.
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new drug delivery system. 167 It has also signed an agreement with
Malaysia Digital Economy Corporation for collaboration on
technology creation. 168 The agreement allows Malaysian tech
businesses to gain access to Japan's "vast research and development
field for creating innovations in technology" and to enter the Japanese
market. 169 In addition, France Brevets and Korea's ID are changing
their direction by focusing "more closely on out-licensing and
sales." 70
Since the birth of SPFs, no direct evidence has emerged in Japan,
Taiwan, Korea, China, and France relating to governments in these
countries developing policies in favor of their SPFs while harassing
companies from other countries. The fear articulated, though rational,
does not as of yet have much support in reality. For the lingering
skeptics, time will indeed fully inform us as to the true character of
SPFs. With all the evidence thus far, SPFs' behavior and conduct are
71
more complex within the context of the global innovation market.
SPFs, as of today, neither deserve to be called nor fit squarely within
the conclusory and negative label of patent trolls.
IV.

CONDEMNING

SPFS As

TRADE PROTECTIONISM,
VIOLATORS?

WTO/TRIPS

Should SPFs be condemned as trade protectionist measures adopted
by WTO members against others? This question merits careful
examination.
In 1994 the WTO administered the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") whereby all WTO
member nations agreed to governmental regulation of many forms of
intellectual property.17 2 It is undeniable that the landscape of global
trade competition has since changed, particularly in the area of
intellectual property and innovation. 7 3 The concerns from the United
167

Id.

168

Id.

169

id.

170

Id.

Some scholars have called for better approaches to go beyond the "patent troll"
label and focus on the patent system itself that enables the business model of patent
aggregation entities. See Lemley & Melamed, supranote 143.
171

172 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
173 See generally Susan Riley Keyes, Process Patents: Protection and Weapon in the
Global Marketplace, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 715 (1999) (noting how new DNA

20181

Sovereign Patent Funds

1285

States, Europe, and Japan about intellectual property piracy are
yesterday's news.1 74 Also, trade defense instruments like anti-dumping
and countervailing duties may not be as effective in the area of
technology and innovation.17 5 New concerns arise, such as the global
trade witnesses Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and France using patents
as their new trade defense weapons through SPF aggregation and
assertion of the patent portfolios against foreign companies. 176
Is this new trade defense SPFs a form of government
protectionism as some patents have become globally valuable and
potent to competitors in the big tech industry? This concern centers
on the fact that the SPFs aggregate patents with funding directly from
the foreign governments, very unlike NPEs that are organically and
privately sourced as seen in the United States. SPFs then use the
patents against companies from other countries, including the United
States. Consequently, by sponsoring SPFs, governments depress
recombinant technology led the United States to change from even-handed intellectual
property to technology-specific protectionism through specific enactment of process
patent legislation that causes a conflict between intellectual property protection and
free trade expansion, specifically, shielding the new technology industry from foreign
competition).
174 See generally Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in International
Intellectual Property Law, 40 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1021 (2007), observing how intellectual
property rights are "increasingly an arena of global cooperation and conflict.... Once
limited to a set of relatively anemic treaties that lacked an effective means of
international enforcement, in the last decade [it] . . . has been transformed by a dense
array of new institutions and agreements. These institutions and agreements have in
turn transformed both the substance and the process of international IP lawmaking."
Discussion about intellectual property today touches on diverse subjects from "patent
rights as a biosecurity strategy" in anti-terrorism to tax havens for intellectual
property assets. See, e.g., Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 FLA.
TAX REV. 483, 527 (2016) (explaining an international tax avoidance scheme
involving intellectual property development); Taiwo A. Oriola, Against the Plague:
Exemption of PharmaceuticalPatent Rights as a Biosecurity Strategy, 2007 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 287 (discussing intellectual property law in the context of bioweapons
and efforts to counter terrorism).
175 The United States, knowing that antidumping and countervailing duties based
on international law to curb unfair international trade are not sufficient, employs
other relief and retaliatory measures under Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930. See,
e.g., David Scott Nance, Relief from Unfair Import Practices Under Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930: An Overview, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 493, 493 (1988)
("Section 337 ... is unique among the trade laws of the United States because it
addresses certain activities, such as patent infringement and price fixing, and because
of the broad nature of the remedies available under it, especially total exclusion of
foreign imports under order.").
176 Hosuk Lee-Makiyama & Patrick Messerlin, Sovereign Patent Funds (SPFs): NextGeneration Trade Defence?, EUR. CTR. FOR INT'L POL. ECON. (June 2014),
http://ecipe.org/publications/SPF.
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international technology transfer in areas where SPFs have patent
rights.1 77 Alarmed, critics voice concern that SPFs would stifle
innovation. 178 There are several problems with this argument. First,
there is no evidence that obtaining patents for innovations and
commercializing them discourages international technology transfers.
There is no evidence showing that international technology transfers
were robust before SPFs' creation and then decline thereafter.179
Second, the patent system exists to encourage innovations, as
inventors receive limited protection for a short period of time. 80 With
qualified innovations protected as patents, the patentees have the right
to exploit their patents. Regardless, whether exploiting patents is done
directly by the original inventors, research institutions, or by SPFs on
behalf of the inventors and institutions, the delegated conduct is not
synonymous with discouraging international technology transfer.
Another concern rests on the possibility that foreign governments
may have an even darker agenda: that they, after creating SPFs, may
draft legislations "designed to advantage domestic firms by harassing
177 Professors Bessen and Meurer have voiced their concerns about SPFs:
In recent years, some of the United States' closest trading partners have
established enterprises for the purpose of asserting patents. France with its
troll called France Brevets, which translates literally to "France Patents",
Japan with its troll named the Innovation Network Corporation of Japan,
and the Taiwanese Industrial Technology and Research Institute are all
examples of governments which sponsor patent trolls that are frequently
active in US courts. The latest entrant into this space is the government of
China which established its own troll called Ruichuan IPR Funds earlier in
this year. Government-sponsored patent trolls amass patents and assert them
against companies from other countries, including American firms. A
particularly notable example is Taiwan's ITRI which has used an arsenal of
over 18,000 patents to sue non-Taiwanese firms in American courts. These
actions have the potential to discourage international technology transfer,
and dampen innovation within targeted firms and economies.
Michael J. Meurer & James Bessen, Congress Needs to Rein in Patent Trolls, Bos. GLOBE
(Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/11/04/congress-needsrein-patent-trolls/BSuITBqcU llmtYlrqSK6yO/story.html.
178

Id.

179 See id. For further evidence that SPFs have not reduced international tech
transfers, given the complete absence of a discussion on SPFs in the authoritative
WIPO report on international technology transfers, see InternationalTech Transfer:An
Analysis from the Perspective of Developing Countries, WIPO (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_14/cdip_14infJ 11.pdf.
iso The patent system - from innovations to commercialization - is imperfect,
and many scholars have proposed ways to improve it. See, e.g., Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REv. 341 (2010). With all of its imperfection, the
current system is what is available to govern existing patents.
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foreign competitors."181 The lingering fear is that even if a government
does not have such an agenda, by acquiring patents in a particular key
domestic industry the government through SPFs could potentially
suppress competition in that industry.1 82 Another fear is that the
government is using SPFs "to augment the competitiveness of ailing
national champions against foreign competition." 8 3 To suspicious
minds, France Brevets and other SPFs are "retaliatory or
discriminatory instruments" against foreign companies regardless of
whether the patent claims are "legitimate or not."1 84 The only way for
foreign companies to compete with the domestic industry is to accept
licenses with terms imposed by SPFs.185 In other words, foreign
companies are paying a new form of discriminatory tax on products
that are posing threats to domestic industry.
This argument, like others, is contrary to reality. Despite SPFs
having been in existence for some time, no evidence has emerged to
demonstrate that the governments of SPFs have been engaged in
systematic conduct of harassment of foreign firms. Also, France
Brevets brought patent infringement suits against LG and HTC to
enforce patent rights, as there is no French domestic industry to
compete with LG and HTC. As seen, the settlement in the two cases
resulted in worldwide licensing based on the patent rights, not
protecting ailing national champions. Likewise, IP Bridge's litigations
are based on patents once owned by Panasonic, a former electronics
manufacturer, which now has a different business focus. Moreover, IP
Bridge has been involved in R&D with research institutions in Japan
and other Asian countries. ITRI and ID have been working directly
with individual inventors, startups, and universities in new areas of
innovation. France Brevets teamed up with Airbus and Ericsson,
which is not a French company, to focus on strategies to license their
own patent assets. Again, no evidence exists that SPFs' patent claims
are bogus, frivolous, retaliatory, or discriminatory.
The last concern is the proliferation of SPFs. As SPFs are being
created by mid-sized economies, such as France, Korea, and Japan,
these countries may serve as a signal to other nations that they should
do the same. A prime example of a copycat of similar size and
capability is Canada. However, Canada has refrained from joining the
group, even though its government and experts have studied and
181

Meurer & Bessen, supra note 177.
See Lee-Makiyama & Messerlin, supra note 176.
183 Id. at 1.
184 Id. at 4.
185 See generally id.
182

1288

[Vol. 51:1257

University of California,Davis

examined whether it should create SPFs. 186 Yet another example of a
copycat with a higher degree of consequence is China. If China, a
more powerful and bigger economy that is second after the United
States, actively participates in the "race to the bottom," the mid-sized
economies will not be able to compete with China's appetite and
resource-rich capability to aggregate and assert patents against
everyone globally.187 The impact will be potentially devastating to
innovation. This warning certainly warrants attention. However, there
is evidence suggesting that the SPF model is not viable for others to
duplicate, as discussed fully in Part VI.188
Whether governments will be successful in their short-term efforts
of helping domestic companies and sectors remains to be seen. If there
is evidence that SPFs are indeed trade protectionist measures, the
WTO's framework to combat the measures is available.
V.

WTO

TRADE SOLUTIONS FOR

SPFS

Ironically, while some countries are allegedly creating SPFs as their
new trade defense instead of relying on the old trade defenses of antidumping and countervailing duties, other countries may rely on the
same old trade defense of countervailing duties against SPFs as an
actionable subsidy under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures ("SCM").189 This Part will explain what the
186 The
Centre for Digital Entrepreneurship
+ Economic Performance
("deepcentre") in Canada has conducted its study on SPFs. See CLARKE & HINTON,
supra note 42; DAN HERMAN & WARREN CLARKE, DEEPCENTRE, THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN
PATENT FUNDS: INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS (Sept. 2014), http://deepcentre.com/

wordpress/wp-contentl/uploads/20 14/09/DEEP-Centre-The-Rise-of-Sovereign-PatentFundsSEPT-2014.pdf; PIERRE-EMMANUEL MOYSE & M. JEAN-ARPAD FRANCAIS, MCGILL
CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP., SOVEREIGN PATENT FUNDS: IS THERE A CANADIAN OPTION? IP

&

POLICY IN THE MAKING (July 12, 2015), http://www.cippmcgill.ca/files/sites/45/2016/06/
Goddard-Sculthorpe.pdf.
187 See Balto, supra note 144.
188 See infra Part VI, for further discussion.
189 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. For an overview of SCM, see Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/scm e/subse.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
Countervailing duties are duties to counter the negative impact of import subsidies to
protect domestic producers. For example, "when a foreign government provides
assistance and subsidies, such as tax breaks to manufacturers that export goods to the
U.S., enabling the manufacturers to sale the goods cheaper than domestic
manufacturers," the countervailing duties are calculated to "duplicate the value of the
subsidy." Anti-Dumping (AD) and Countervailing Duties (CVD), U.S. CUSTOMS
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WTO legal framework requires and analyze whether SPFs may fall
within the prohibited subsidies.
No one can ignore the reality that WTO members create and
implement new initiatives every day. Obviously, not all government
initiatives and policies are deemed to be subsidies under the SCM. A
subsidy is deemed to exist if (1) there is a financial contribution; (2)
by a "government or any public body"; and (3) a benefit is thereby
conferred.1 90 Upon finding the existence of the subsidy, the next
inquiry will focus on whether the subsidy is actionable under the
SCM. That means whether the subsidy is specific to "an enterprise or
industry or group of enterprises or industries"191 and causes "adverse
effects" or "injury to the domestic industry of another Member."1 92
With respect to the "financial contribution" factor, the SCM
provides a list of government practices deemed to be financial
contributions, including grants, loans, loan guarantees, fiscal
incentives, provision of goods or services, or provision of payments to
a funding mechanism or directing a private entity to carry out any of
the financial contribution measures.1 93 As seen in how France Brevets,
IP Bridge, ID, ITRI, and Ruichuan IPR each received funding from
their respective governments, the "financial contribution" is present.
The next factor to consider is whether the financial contribution is
provided "by a government or any public body." Ascertaining the
meaning of the phrase "government or public body" requires attention
to the WTO Appellate Body Report in 2011 in the United StatesDefinitive Antidumping and Countervailing Duties ("Tribunal
Decision").1 94 The Tribunal ruled that the concept of "public body"
shares certain "attributes" with the concept of "government" and that
a "public body" within the meaning of an SCM Agreement must be
"an entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental
authority."1 95 Recognizing that there are no precise contours of a
public body, the determination must be on a case-by-case basis "by
BORDER PROTECTION, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detailla-id/216/-/anti-dumping-

%28ad%29-and-countervailing-duties-%28cvd%29
190 SCM Agreement, supranote 189, art. 1.
191
192

193

(last updated Dec. 10, 2017).

Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 1.1(a)(1).

194 Appellate
Body Report, United States Definitive Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/ABR
(adopted Mar. 11, 2011), https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FESearch/FESSO09DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueldList=104996&CurrentCatalogueldlndex=0&FullText
Hash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&HasSpanishRecord=True.
195 Id. 11313.
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conducting a proper evaluation of the core features of the entity
concerned, and its relationship with government in the narrow
sense."1 96 The Tribunal noted that the absence of express statutory
delegation of authority does not necessarily preclude a conclusion that
a particular entity is a "public body."1 97 Also, the Tribunal rejected
that having the government as the majority shareholder of an entity
demonstrates the government exercises meaningful control over that
entity.1 98 Likewise, the existence of mere formal links between an
entity and government is unlikely to establish the necessary possession
of governmental authority.1 99 The Tribunal concluded: "What matters
is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental
functions, rather than how that is achieved." 200 In short, the term
"public body" refers to entities "owned or controlled by the
government." 201

Under the Tribunal Decision, France Brevets is more likely to be
found as a "government or public body" because the French
government has created and directly operates and controls the entity.
The government saw an urgent need to create France Brevets in the
age of the patent market; the government announced its purpose of
building strategic patent positions and monetizing them through
focused licensing efforts. France Brevets is conducting these tasks
because the French government believes that private entities alone
cannot build a "fair return for public and private research" and "foster
transfers to industry." The French government provided the funding
and hired experts to execute the plan. The capital for the fund came
directly and only from the government. No private funding has been
sought.
The other SPFs from Asia are public-private partnerships. The
governments creating these SPFs provide the majority of the capital
while the private companies provide a fraction of the capital. The
funds carry the governmental goals of building innovation and patent
markets. The funds operate within the governments' control, as seen
recently in Korea's SPF Intellectual Discovery, whose CEO resigned
because he was frustrated with the high amount of governmental

196

Id.

197

Id. 1314.

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id.

201

Id.

17.
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control and wished the particular fund to be free of governmental
control.202

The next factor is whether a benefit has been conferred. Turning to
the Appellate Body's Report is again instructive in understanding this
factor. In Canada-Aircraft, the Appellate Body held that a benefit had
been conferred when the financial contribution made the recipient
"better off" than it would have been without the contribution. 203 In this
sense, determining "benefit" implies a comparison "whether the
recipient has received a financial contribution on terms more favorable
than those available to the recipient in the market." 204 It follows that
SPFs may indeed confer a benefit. Simply, the vast patent portfolio
aggregated by an SPF provides domestic companies access to the pool
pursuant to a license agreement compared to having to separately
license each patent in the pool directly from licensors. The patent pool
eases the patent access and reduces the costs for domestic companies.
Without the government's intervention (i.e., creation of an SPF),
domestic companies would not have gained access to needed patents at
a low price. Because there is no alternative market in existence to allow
domestic companies to gain access to patents, there is no evidence of
an SPF not conferring a benefit. If there were a preexisting market of
patents, there would be no need for the governments to create SPFs! In
other words, a benefit has indeed been conferred in SPFs.

202 Jacob Schindler, More Upheaval in the SPF Sector as Intellectual Discovery CEO
Resigns, INTELL. AsSET MGMT.: BLOG (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.iammedia.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=b7dd4a7b-dab7-433f-ae97-863557b2ecOe
(reporting
the resignation of Kwang-Jun Kim, CEO of Korea's SPF Intellectual Discovery due to
"fundamental differences of opinion with the fund's public sector backers over the
level of financial support ID should receive from the government as well as the future
direction of the company").
203 The Appellate Body stated:

We also believe that the word "benefit", as used in Article 1.1(b), implies
some kind of comparison. This must be so, for there can be no "benefit" to
the recipient unless the "financial contribution" makes the recipient "better
off' than it would otherwise have been, absent that contribution. In our
view, the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in
determining whether a "benefit" has been "conferred", because the tradedistorting potential of a "financial contribution" can be identified by
determining whether the recipient has received a "financial contribution" on
terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market.
Appellate Body Report, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, I
157, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 2, 1999).
204 Id.
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Assuming SPFs are a subsidy, the next inquiry is determining
whether the SPFs are an actionable subsidy within the meaning of the
SCM. This inquiry requires ascertaining whether the subsidy is
specific to certain enterprises or industries. In US-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body Panel found that certain
eligibility criteria for a particular government program "have the effect
of limiting eligibility to a subset of basic agricultural products." 205
Therefore the subsidies were deemed "specific." 206 In US-Softwood
Lumber IV, the "wood products industries" satisfied specificity because
it was limited to a group of industries. 207 The Tribunal in that case
205 Panel Report, United States - Subsidies on Upland Cotton, ¶¶ 7.1147-7.1148,
WTO Doc. WT/DS267/R (adopted Sept. 8, 2004) ("We believe that a subsidy that is
limited to a small proportion of industries, such as those producing one or two
individual United States products would be limited and thus 'specific' within the
meaning of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement. These subsidies are 'specific' as they are
not even available in respect of a number of commodities. . . . Other measures before
us pertain to a restricted number of agricultural products, but are not widely or
generally available in respect of all agricultural production, let alone the entire
universe of United States production of goods. These measures include the marketing
loan programme payments. They also include the measures available in respect of
upland cotton as part of a restricted basket of agricultural commodities. These are the
four types of domestic support which permit production flexibility (PFC, MLA, DP
and CCP payments) that were or are provided in respect of certain agricultural
production in a base period which satisfies certain eligibility criteria. These criteria
have the effect of limiting eligibility to a subset of basic agricultural products,
including upland cotton or certain other programme crops. We therefore find that
these subsidies are 'specific' within the meaning of Article 2. The fact that some of the
subsidies go to farmers who may produce different commodities, or, in theory, may
not produce a given commodity does not mean, by some process of reverse reasoning,
that the specificity that is apparent from the face of the grant instrument no longer
exists." (footnote omitted)), affd by Appellate Body Report, United States - Subsidies
on Upland Cotton, '1 289-294, WT/DS267/AB/RW (adopted June 2, 2008).
206 Id.
207 Panel Report, United States - Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 919[ 7.121, 7.125, WTO Doc.
WT/DS257/R (adopted Aug. 29, 2003) ("The USDOC Determination considered that
only a group of wood product industries, consisting of the pulp and paper mills and
the sawmills and re-manufacturers which are producing the subject merchandise used
the stumpage programmes. It does not seem that USDOC simply labelled an
aggregation of producers as a group of industries merely because they use a particular
programme. In our view, the opposite was the case. As Canada recognized, the
stumpage programme can clearly only benefit certain enterprises in the wood product
industries which can harvest and / or process the good provided, standing timber. In
sum, the text of Article 2 SCM Agreement does not require a detailed analysis of the
end-products produced by the enterprises involved, nor does Article 2.1 (c) SCM
Agreement provide that only a limited number of products should benefit from the
subsidy. In our view, it was reasonable of the USDOC to reach the conclusion that the
use of the alleged subsidy was limited to an industry or a group of industries. We
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instructed, with respect to finding specificity, that "[in the case of a
good that is provided by the government - and not just money,
which is fungible - and that has utility only for certain enterprises
(because of its inherent characteristics), it is all the more likely that a
subsidy conferred via the provision of that good is specifically
provided to certain enterprises only." 208 Also, defacto specificity exists

even if only a small number of companies within a particular industry
are using a government program, as shown in EC-DRAMs Chips where
only six out of 200 eligible companies used a particular government
program. 209 Accordingly, specificity is readily found in SPFs. Applying
these various interpretations of specificity dictated by WTO Tribunals
to what SPFs have done, from purchasing patents in particular
industries, near field communication, smart grids, aerospace, and the
like, to creating patent markets in those industries, and to obtaining
patent licenses for those industries, the SPFs are subsidies specific to
certain enterprises and industries.
Last, the inquiry shifts to whether the subsidy causes "adverse
effects" or "injury to the domestic industry of another WTO member."
In other words, the subsidy is actionable if material injury can be
established by evidence. For example, by establishing that a subsidy is
displacing or impeding imports or exports of a "like product" of
another member, the subsidy is actionable. Illustratively, a member
"whose coal industry is injured by another member's coal subsidies
could certainly bring an action, because these two products are
identical." 210 With regards to SPFs, as many SPFs have been created to
consider that the 'wood products industries' constitutes at most only a limited group
of industries - the pulp industry, the paper industry, the lumber industry and the
lumber remanufacturing industry - under any definition of the term 'limited'. We do
not consider determinative in this respect the fact that these industries may be
producing many different end-products. As we discussed above, specificity under
Article 2 SCM is to be determined at the enterprise or industry level, not at the
product level. . . . We find therefore that the USDOC determination that the stumpage
programmes which are used only by a limited group of wood product industries are in
fact specific, is not inconsistent with Article 2.1 (c) SCM Agreement." (footnotes
omitted)), affd by Appellate Body Report, United States - Final CountervailingDuty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber From Canada, WTO Doc.
WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2004).
208 Id. '1 7.116.
209 Panel Report, European Communities Countervailing Measures on Dynamic
Random Access Memory Chips from Korea, 1 7.223-32, WTO Doc. WT/DS299/R
(adopted June 17, 2005).
210 Chris Wold, Grant Wilson & Sara Foroshani, Leveraging Climate Change
Benefits Through the World Trade Organization:Are Fossil Fuel Subsidies Actionable?, 43
GEO. J. INT'L L. 635, 640 (2012).
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aggregate patents in specific industries to assist domestic companies in
those industries, if SPFs achieve the stated goals, their very successes
may be useful in establishing the required displacing or impeding
imports or exports of a like product.
In summary, the SCM mechanism exists for WTO members to
utilize if they have evidence to establish that SPFs of a specific
member constitute actionable subsidies. The injured member can then
bring an action with the WTO Tribunal. Success will depend on
whether evidence indeed exists to meet each factor of the inquiry.
Utilizing the WTO Tribunal is perhaps more effective in solving
problems related to SPFs than the labeling of SPFs as patent trolls.
VI.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?

Attention devoted to SPFs may be much ado about nothing. First,
the structure of SPFs can be easily altered to quiet critics about the
uncomfortable characteristic of SPFs being government-sponsored.
SPFs can be created as robust public-private partnerships. As more
private enterprises participate and join in the creation and
development of SPFs as strong public and private partnerships, the
government-sponsored issue becomes moot.
Second, legal challenges to SPFs under the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures will not materialize. Simply,
SPFs are not deemed to be subsidies within the meaning of SCM. The
change in structure in SPFs from government-sponsored to
meaningful public-private partnerships will reduce control exercised
by the government on SPFs. Within the public-private partnership
framework, SPFs can operate with an independent board and its
executives would conduct the operation of the SPFs as a private entity.
When more private enterprises participate in SPFs, the monetization
received from licensing after deduction of the sharing percentage to
original patentees or inventors will be reinvested. That means WTO
members will not be able to meet factors such as "public body," as
government will have no meaningful control over SPFs.
Lastly, the SPF model of strict government control is not viable in
the dynamic global innovation and patent market. Governments
simply do not have the financial resources to continuously supply
SPFs, as some SPFs have already faced budget crises. 211 To rectify the
211 For example, as recounted by the former CEO of ID, the company faced a
budget crisis "because it [was] getting far less financial support from the government
than it had in previous years. The organisation's budget dropped off precipitously
beginning in late 2014, . . . when responsibility for ID was transferred from Korea's
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financial uncertainty, for instance, Korea's SPF, Intellectual Discovery,
is exploring strategic options of a new future as a private entity. 212
Though ID has been enjoying some success in licensing revenues and
patent transactions, the desire to go private is very strong. Most
importantly, going private would free ID from the government's
restrictions on its activities and relationships with potential
partners.2 13 In fact, ID is looking forward to having the freedom to
broaden its "horizons, perhaps working with non-Korean operating
companies and partnering with other NPEs." 214 Similarly, Japan's IP
Bridge is looking forward to its future of being fully private. As
recalled, IP Bridge is currently public-private though the substantial
majority of its funding is from the government. IP Bridge's CEO
believes that commercialization of its patents is the "kind of business
[that] should ultimately be managed by the private sector."2 15
Government support in the form of public funding would be an
"eventual evaporation." 216 Both ID and IP Bridge are keenly aware that
success in commercialization of their patent portfolios can only fully
occur if they follow the examples of Intellectual Ventures and other
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy to the Korean Intellectual Property Office
(KIPO), and has continued to be cut since then. Operating under the aegis of the IP
office also restricted the opportunities his team of 15 could pursue." Schindler, supra
note 202.
212 See Jack Ellis, The Futurefor Asia's Sovereign Patent Funds Is in the Private Sector, Say
Their Chief Executives, INTELL ASSET MGMT.: BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), http:I/www.iammedia.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=f8bef7f5-d5d4-4b96-ae5d-e75b4db7b096
[hereinafter The
Futurefor Asia's SPFs].
213 The competing goals between the governmental and the SPF ID have led to the
resignation of the CEO, as the CEO insisted that the future of ID is in the private
sector. Schindler, supra note 202.
214 In the interview conducted by IAM, Kwang Jun Kim, ID's CEO, revealed the
benefits of privatization for ID and the near future for privatization plans. See Ellis,
The Future for Asia's SPFs, supra note 212 ("Going private means we would have a
little more freedom - we'd be able to broaden our horizons, perhaps working with
non-Korean operating companies and partnering with other NPEs, if those scenarios
are consistent with our strategy and goals.").
215 Shigeharu Yoshii, CEO, IP Bridge stated that:
The IP business which we are running is necessary for the healthy growth of
industries and academic research institutes, but it takes years to make a
profit until that business can continue to run independently . . .. Therefore,
so-called "patient capital", such as government-supported funding, is
necessary. But we think that this kind of business should ultimately be
managed by the private sector. Therefore, government support should be
limited to the initial stages.
Id.
216

Id.

University of California, Davis

1296

[Vol. 51:1257

NPEs which were formed by entities in the private sector free of
governmental impetus in the United States. 217 In order to compete
with others in the global market, SPFs must operate on equal footing
with other private NPEs, free of government rules and interferences.
In other words, judging from where the most influential SPFs in Asia
218
are heading, SPFs will soon be relics of the past.

CONCLUSION

SPFs are diverse and complex. They will soon evolve in directions
and goals in the ever-changing global innovation and patent markets.
As SPFs evolve to be either private entities or robust public-private
partnerships, concerns relating to illegal trade subsidy and
government-sponsored discriminatory measures will subside. The
creation and development of different SPFs, however, should prompt
us to reexamine patents and the very laws creating and maintaining
patents to become global assets.

217

Jd

Schindler, supra note 202 ("The trend here is that the sovereign patent fund will
lose its sovereign status.").
218

